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The Great Divide: Recent Trends Could Help
Bridge the US/EU Data Privacy Gap
Patrick Troy Hatfield
I. INTRODUCTION
You have heard the word “data” used in the news, on TV, and in
numerous other mediums, but what does “data” mean? Tech companies,
governments, and computer geeks deal with data, but the word doesn’t seem
to have much weight to the average person. It should. Google alters its
search results to cater to you.1 Amazon offers different products at different
prices to different consumers.2 The United States government collects
phone records by the billions.3 Blogs, websites, photos, bank statements—
all of these involve data. Your data. Your information. Imagine if that
information fell into the wrong hands and was used to intimidate you or
your family. Imagine if it were being used to cheat you out of your
hard-earned money. Now imagine if that same data could prevent a terrorist
attack. Data can run the gambit of social concerns from freedom of speech
to personal privacy to a nation’s struggle to protect its citizens from harm. It
has to be regulated, but how?
Answers to that question vary, and data security experts have long feared
a clash between the US data privacy regime and that of the European Union

1

Grace Nasri, Is Google’s Search Manipulation Hurting Customers?, DIGITAL TRENDS
(Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/bias-and-google-shopping/.
2
Anita Ramasastry, Websites change prices based on customers’ habits, CNN.COM
(June 24, 2005, 3:14 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/24/ramasastry.website.prices/.
3
Barton Gellman, Edward Snowden, after months of NSA revelations, says his mission’s
accomplished, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-monthsof-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html.
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(EU).4 Pending EU legislation could make that fear a reality. In 2012, a new
regulatory structure was proposed that would replace the current EU
Privacy Directive (Directive).5 Under the current system, a rift exists
between the EU and the United States over the US regime’s prioritization of
security over privacy.6 The EU considers personal privacy to be a
fundamental right.7 However, the current Directive allows for exceptions
and loopholes that have kept the differences in regimes from being too
prohibitive for US business and government interests.8 The pending
legislation will remove many of these exceptions and loopholes, impose
harsher restrictions for violations, and include new provisions that would
further distance the EU regime from US norms.9
Although this may seem like a battle that will only affect big business
and government interests, it has far-reaching implications for individual
rights and freedoms. The way that these governments and businesses handle
data privacy fundamentally affects personal privacy. For instance, Google
and Facebook could have to alter the way they store personal data as a
result of the EU legislation, which would change how personal information
is maintained and accessed and could result in more stringent privacy
protections for individuals.10 Conversely, the EU legislation could restrict
the storage of and access to information in such a way that would limit

4
Alessandra Suuberg, The View from the Crossroads: The European Union’s New Data
Rules and the Future of U.S. Privacy Law, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 267, 268–
86 (2013).
5
Id.
6
See DAVID BENDER, WHICH REGIME OFFERS MORE ACTUAL PRIVACY – US OR EU?,
(2014), available at LexisNexis 7189.
7
Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
8
Edward R. Alo, EU Privacy Protection: A Step Towards Global Privacy, 22 MICH. ST.
INT’L L. REV. 1095, 1110–1111 (2013).
9
See id. at 1129.
10
See Fundamental Overhaul of EU Data Protection Regime Unveiled, TAYLOR
WESSING GLOBAL DATA HUB,
http://www.taylorwessing.com/globaldatahub/article_eu_dp_regulation.html (last visited
Dec. 6, 2014).
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freedom of speech and could cause barriers to freely sharing and accessing
previously public information.11 Furthermore, the US government has
espoused the idea that personal privacy may be infringed upon if it means
that citizens are safe from threats, such as terrorism, while the EU has taken
the opposite approach and has provided its citizens with privacy as an
“absolute right.”12 These differing approaches have resulted in different
means of achieving the same end—protection of the citizenry.
The EU employs an omnibus privacy structure, which means that no
sector (or type of data) is left unprotected because all data is treated the
same, regardless of what it is used for or what it contains.13 This structure is
largely considered to provide a great deal of privacy protection because of
the reliance on uniformity, but detractors argue that it is slow moving and
overly bureaucratic.14 The presence of US businesses in Europe and the
transference of data into the United States have been seen as hindrances to
these protections because of the difference in the way the US government
approaches data privacy.15
The United States employs a sectoral privacy structure. This structure
allows different rules to pertain to different sectors because data can be
more or less sensitive from sector to sector.16 For instance, in the United
States, medical information is treated very differently from other types of

11

See Craig Timberg & Sarah Halzach, Right to be Forgotten vs Free Speech, WASH.
POST (May 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/right-to-beforgotten-vs-free-speech/2014/05/14/53c9154c-db9d-11e3-bda1
9b46b2066796_story.html.
12
Alo, supra note 8, at 1102–1105.
13
Id.
14
BENDER, supra note 6.
15
See Christopher Wolf, Delusions of Adequacy? Examining the Case for Finding the
United States Adequate for Cross-Border EU-U.S. Data Transfers, 43 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 227, 231 (2013).
16
See BENDER, supra note 6.
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data.17 Data brokerage has been an area left largely outside of the umbrella
of protections because of strong business interests and an emphasis on
greater security.18 This sectoral structure has made EU member states wary
of allowing their data to be stored in the United States because they fear that
businesses will be able to abuse the data and that US intelligence services
will be able to search the data without cause.19 The resulting rift between
the two regimes has meant that data sometimes falls through the gray area
in between, and, at times, citizens’ rights have been left unprotected.
However, shifts in policy in both the United States and EU could speak to
a more cooperative future between the two regimes. Despite the proposed
legislation being seen as increasing the gap, there has been pushback among
EU member states.20 Security and anti-terrorism concerns have forced the
EU to be more proactive and less reliant on US intelligence. While the EU
maintains its focus on privacy within the realm of business and personal
data, it has expressed the necessity of safety concerns with regard to the
collection and access of data by governments.21 Similarly, US policy has
undergone a recent shift toward the mean by expressing a renewed interest
in maintaining personal privacy. A recent White House report on “big data”
echoed this sentiment, and there has been cooperation with Canada in
protecting Canadian personal data.22 Likely most compelling, however, are
17

Health Information Privacy, HHS.GOV,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/index.html
(last visited Dec. 6, 2014).
18
See BENDER, supra note 6.
19
Id.
20
Konrad Lischka & Christian Stocker, Data Protection: All You Need to Know About
the EU Privacy Debate, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Jan. 18, 2013),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-european-union-closes-in-on-dataprivacy-legislation-a-877973.html.
21
KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.-EU COOPERATION AGAINST
TERRORISM 3–4 (2010), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf.
22
See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED
WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN
THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
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recent Supreme Court warrantless cell phone seizure decisions that express
the need for data protection by limiting the scope of data seizure during an
arrest because of the sensitive nature of that data.23 Ultimately, both the
United States and EU have recognized a need for global interoperability if
any data protection regime is to be effective.24 That interoperability can
only occur if both sides are willing to cooperate.
The common perception is that the US data privacy regime cannot
adequately address the personal data privacy concerns held by EU member
states, and that the pending EU privacy legislation will have a detrimental
effect on US business concerns.25 However, the divide between US security
concerns and EU privacy concerns is overstated. The aforementioned shifts
in policy by both parties have likely pushed the two regimes closer than
ever. The goal of both is to weigh the personal privacy of their citizens
against the security of those citizens and the nation and to eventually be part
of a globally viable protection scheme that will allow their people to freely
use technology without having their rights unjustly infringed upon.26 A
compromise needs to be made before conflict between the regimes is
realized and it detrimentally affects those meant to be protected.
This compromise should involve three major aspects. First, “the right to
be forgotten” should be removed from the pending legislation. This
provision is likely the least workable provision within the framework of US
privacy law. Much debate, even within the EU, has centered on this

23
David Bender, Supreme Court Prohibits Warrantless Cell Phone Searches Incident to
Arrest, LEXISNEXIS GROUP (July 3, 2014),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/criminal/b/criminal-lawblog/archive/2014/07/22/supreme-court-prohibits-warrantless-cell-phone-searchesincident-arrest-fourth-amendment-invariant-technology-facts-legal-conclusions.aspx.
24
See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 22.
25
See BENDER, supra note 6.
26
Jay Johnson, Report on Global Data Hints Toward Global Interoperability, LAW 360
(May 16, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/538570/report-on-big-data-hintstoward-global-interoperability.
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provision as unfeasible within a globalized structure.27 At its core, the
provision provides a way for interested parties to erase their personal
information.28 Critics from the United States have consistently pointed to
freedom of speech concerns and the burdensome nature of drudging through
mountains of data to delete every mention of a particular party as reasons
that the right to be forgotten cannot coexist with current US law.29
Second, the warrantless cell phone seizure cases should be used to drive
privacy policy revision in the United States. The largest concern that nonUS parties have with the US regime is that the sectoral system, paired with
the PATRIOT Act, allows for sensitive personal information to be seized
and accessed at will and without cause.30 The cell phone cases are a step
toward assuaging these concerns. In them, the judiciary indicated the
importance of having a valid reason for accessing something as sensitive as
personal data, and that government officials should not be able to do so
without a show of cause.31 Implementation of these holdings across a
broader spectrum (and for non-US citizens) would do much to close the
gap.
Third, since both sides have indicated a need and a willingness to
cooperate with each other, they should actually do so, and they can look to
Canadian action as a guide. Canada’s regime is more similar to the EU
system than to the US framework.32 However, practical concerns have
27

Eduardo Ustaran, The Wider Effect of the “Right to be Forgotten” Case, 14 PRIVACY
& DATA PROTECTION 18 (2014).
28
Id.
29
See DAVID BENDER, INSIGHT INTO SELECTED PROVISIONS OF PROPOSED EU DATA
PROTECTION REGULATION (2014), available at LexisNexis 7222.
30
Alex Lakatos, The Patriot Act and the Cloud: Part 2, LAW 360 (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://www.law360.com/articles/301726/the-patriot-act-and-the-cloud-part-2 [hereinafter
Lakatos, Part 2].
31
See generally Riley v. California, 134 U.S. 2473 (2014).
32
See Paul A. Meyer, Achieving Canada-United States Economic Competitiveness
Through Regulatory Convergence—A Common Cause Agenda: Divergence and
Convergence of Data Privacy Rules–Myth and Reality, 36 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 77, 112–113
(2011).
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necessitated cooperation and interaction between Canada and the United
States because of close government, business, and geographic ties. Despite
this cooperation, Canada has been able to maintain strong data storage and
transfer relationships with EU businesses and member states as well.33 The
discourse between Canada and the United States on the subject should be
used as a roadmap for cooperation between the United States and EU.
This article advocates for compromise between the United States and EU
on data privacy issues by considering these three points, their impacts, and
how they could catalyze the push toward global interoperability. In the first
section, this paper will discuss EU privacy law with a focus on the Directive
and the proposed changes to the regime. Furthermore, this paper will
address how US interests have coexisted within the EU regime, and how
American actors will have to adapt when the proposed legislation is
enacted. The second section will focus on privacy law in the United States,
how the sectoral system is different, how security concerns took the
forefront post-9/11, and why the regime has been met with skepticism by
the EU. In the third section, this paper will address recent developments that
will impact privacy concerns. These developments include the EU’s
increased security concerns, more weight being placed on privacy concerns
in the United States, and interaction between both regimes and Canada. The
fourth section will then tie these ideas together into a proposal for
compromise and a more uniform system.

II. EU PRIVACY LAW
The EU data privacy Directive currently governs data privacy among EU
member states. This Directive provides that
data-processing systems are designed to serve man; whereas they
must, whatever the nationality or residence of natural persons,
respect their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to

33

Id.
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privacy, and contribute to economic and social progress, trade
expansion and the well-being of individuals.34
This distinction is important because it explicitly notes that the right to
privacy is fundamental with regard to data processing, and this right extends
to peoples of all nationalities and residences. The proposed legislation will
keep this spirit of the Directive while creating more stringent protections for
personal data.
A. The Directive
The Directive has an omnibus structure that allows for uniformity across
sectors and provides gap-filling when new areas of privacy concerns arise.
This gap-filling happens because the provisions of the Directive are applied
to every aspect of data privacy.35 For instance, if a new industry or
technology arises that has data privacy implications, an understanding exists
that the rules imposed by the Directive will apply to that new concern.
Furthermore, the Directive follows the ideal of personal privacy as a
fundamental right even in cases where security interests would supersede
personal freedoms in the United States.36
The Directive does not allow for seizure or access of data without a
cause. In fact, the controller of the data must notify the subject if her data is
being processed, and the subject has the right to object
at any time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his
particular situation to the processing of data relating to him, save
where otherwise provided by national legislation. Where there is a
justified objection, the processing instigated by the controller may
no longer involve those data.37

34

Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
See Suuberg, supra note 4.
Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
37
Council Directive 95/46, art. 14, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 42 (EC). Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council § VII Art. 14.
35
36

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

The Great Divide

This provision keeps businesses from using data without a legitimate
reason, and prevents governments from seizing data—unless a member
state can show cause and a link to national security—without having to deal
with objections by the subject of that data because “such interests are
overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data
subject.”38
Data privacy concerns of a national security nature are left to each
member state in the EU to handle on their own, with some European
Council oversight. Under Article 13, “Member States may adopt legislative
measures to restrict the scope of the obligations and rights provided . . .
when such a restriction constitutes a necessary measures to safeguard: (a)
national security; (b) defence; (c) public security.”39 This provision is a
source of contention because it gives a great deal of leeway to the member
states, so long as they do not violate the spirit of the Directive.
The EU’s Directive-based legislation can get bogged down in
bureaucracy because the member states often have competing interests.
Proposed reform in the Directive evidences this bureaucratic mire.40 Data
privacy reform was proposed in January of 2012 in the form of this new
legislation (now called General Data Protection Regulation), and although
the EU has decided that some form of this new legislation will be adopted,
there is still wide-ranging debate—more than three years later—as to what
exactly it will consist of.41
Helene Sjursen (an EU foreign and security policy academic) argues that
since national security concerns are not addressed specifically within the
provisions of the Directive, but are instead left to each state to handle,
immediate action is often difficult to take even in dire situations.42 As such,
38

Council Directive 95/46, art. 7, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 40 (EC).
Council Directive 95/46, art. 13, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 42 (EC).
40
See generally BENDER, supra note 6.
41
See id.
42
See generally HELENE SJURSEN, A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE? 95–112
(John Petersen & Helene Sjursen eds., 1998).
39
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enforcement has been tenuous because of the reliance on member state
action within a broader regulatory scheme, thus, many of the provisions of
the Directive are considered to be without teeth and not a deterrent.43 US
businesses, specifically, have enjoyed a wide array of exemptions under the
Directive’s provisions.44
B. Proposed Legislation
EU member states are pushing the new legislation forward out of a
feeling of necessity.45 This idea of necessity is prevalent despite opposing
views on what provisions should be added or altered. Under the current
regime, there are multiple loopholes and exemptions, many of which are
used and exploited by non-member countries such as the United States, and
the member states feel that it is nearly impossible to protect personal
privacy without a stronger legislative framework.46
To strengthen the privacy framework, the proposed legislation includes
harsher penalties for violations and numerous additional provisions (the
most controversial being the right to be forgotten).
1. Increased Penalties
The current penalty structure of the Directive is not as deterrent as it
could be because of the many exceptions that have allowed for abuses. To
address this issue, EU members proposed a new penalty structure as part of
the new privacy legislation.
These penalties are bound to have a huge impact on businesses based
outside of non-member countries, specifically those from the United States.
A single slip-up in data transfer or storage could result in enormous
43

BENDER, supra note 6.
Wolf, supra note 15, at 231.
45
Press Release, European Commission, Progress on EU Data Protection Reform now
Irreversible Following European Parliament Vote (Mar. 12, 2014), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-186_en.htm.
46
See generally Alo, supra note 8.
44
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monetary loss for those companies.47 Data protection authorities will have
stronger enforcement powers, and the penalty for breaches of data
protection law could reach “€100 million or 5 percent of annual global
turnover—depending on which one is the greater.”48 US companies that
operate in Europe could get stuck in a no-win situation since many of the
exemptions to these penalties under the current structure will be done away
with. “Companies such as Google, Facebook and Apple—which have their
European headquarters in Ireland—may be forced to seek clearance from
data protection authorities before handing over the personal data of their
users to security agencies outside Europe.”49 Every company doing business
and storing data within the EU will have to follow the EU’s rules, but it is
foreseeable that many of these companies will also receive data requests
from US authorities in the interest of national security. They may have to
choose between the penalties imposed by the two regimes. Feasibility is
also a concern, as both the impact of these penalties on business concerns
and the lack of enforcement of previous data privacy legislation are issues
to be dealt with.

2. The Right to be Forgotten
The proposed legislation would mandate that member states adopt
procedures for a right to be forgotten. At its core, the right to be forgotten is
a way for an individual to have his or her data expunged (or forgotten).50
The individual would need to formally petition the local judiciary for their
data to be removed, and then the court would determine if there is a
reasonable basis (such as undue prejudice) for doing so. These requests
47
Dan Rampe, What’s $138,050,000 or 5% of Annual Global Turnover? The Fine
Companies Face if the European Parliament Passes Data Protection Measure,
THREATMETRIX (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.threatmetrix.com/whats-138050000-or-5of-annual-global-turnover-the-fine-companies-face-if-the-european-parliament-passesdata-protection-measure/.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Ustaran, supra note 27.
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would be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether that
information holds some utility that outweighs the concerns of the
petitioner.51
This type of power has been exercised in limited instances in some EU
member states, so there is some precedent for it.52 However, insertion into
the omnibus structure that the EU privacy regime employs would make the
provision pervasive, so its use has been controversial. In fact, Google Spain
was at the center of one such controversy. In 2010, a Spanish national asked
Google Spain to remove links to news articles that detailed the forced sale
of properties owned by him.53 Google Spain refused, so Spain’s data
protection authority ordered them to honor the request because Spanish law
included a right to be forgotten provision.54 Google Spain fell under Spanish
authority for the matter because they could be classified as a “controller”
under the EU Directive, and any controller of data within a state is subject
to that state’s laws.55 The case provided for very limited circumstances in
which such a request could be honored, but explicit inclusion of such a
provision in the Directive would open all EU data law up to the provision.
Since the right to be forgotten has to be considered on a case-by-case
basis, its adoption could result in an overload on the EU privacy regime,
especially when member states that experience much more data traffic than
Spain are included. From an efficiency standpoint, the right may be
unfeasible as currently constructed, and the expectation is that there will be
a flood of petitions seeking to exercise the right.56 Furthermore, the expense
on businesses and data collectors to remove the data could be astronomical.

51

Id.
See, e.g., id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Craig Newman, “A Right to be Forgotten” Will Cost Europe, WASH. POST
(May 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-right-to-be-forgotten-willcost-europe/2014/05/26/93bb0e8c-e131-11e3-9743-bb9b59cde7b9_story.html.
52
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“While Google may have the resources to forge on in Europe, tomorrow’s
Google or Facebook or Tumblr may not. It isn’t difficult to imagine
start-ups simply forgoing a European presence, given the high cost of doing
business there.”57
Critics consider the right to be forgotten to be unrealistic given the
realities of global information sharing, the prevalence of search engines and
data caching, and the very real possibility that, despite all best efforts, it
may not be possible to completely erase all trace of that data. For instance,
after the Google Spain case, Google received “120,000 requests from
individuals to remove certain links from the results of searches for their
name. These have led to more than 457,000 links to articles, websites,
tweets, blogs, photos and Wikipedia entries.”58 Even after removing nearly
500,000 possible hits to their searches, there is no guarantee that Google
found every bit of relevant data.
US detractors, specifically, point to First Amendment concerns with
regard to this right to be forgotten as it could serve to limit freedom of
speech in certain instances.
The media and the press in particular have the constitutional right
to publicize information as long as it is legally available. The
notion that privacy would put a limit on the right of the press to
reveal the shameful past of an individual has been litigated and
rejected in the Supreme Court of the United States. The notion that
constitutional rights could be balanced against each other and that
the freedom to speak and inform could be balanced against a

57

Id.
Juliette Garside, Right to be Forgotten is a False Right, Spanish Editor Tells Google
Panel, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/09/right-to-be-forgotten-spanishhearing-google.
58
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competing constitutional right to one’s private life does not seem
to be an option under US constitutional law.59
C. US Business Interaction with the EU Regime
As discussed previously, much of the perceived problem with the current
Directive has revolved around the exemptions and loopholes employed by
businesses based outside the EU. US businesses, specifically, have largely
been allowed to operate with fewer limitations.60 The current exemption
structure allows for a good deal of gray area for these businesses to operate
in.61 The proposed legislation is, in part, a response to this problem, and it
will greatly impact US business concerns.
1. US Exemptions Under the Directive
The current penalty structure is much less restrictive than the proposed
legislation would be. As currently constructed, US businesses have been
able to escape deterrent punishment even when they have been found to
have violated provisions of the Directive because exemptions are allowable
under member state law and, for some, the penalties are just a cost of doing
business in Europe.62 The Directive states, “Subject to the provision of
suitable safeguards, Member States may, for reasons of substantial public
interest, lay down exemptions . . . either by national law or by decision of
the supervisory authority.”63 Using this provision, EU members are able to
make deals with outside corporations.64 The perception is that if a company
is large enough and generates enough revenue, paying a few minimal fines

59
Suuberg, supra note 4, at 283 (quoting Franz Werro, The Right To Inform v. The Right
To Be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash, in LIABILITY IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 285–
86 (Aurelia C. Ciacchi et al. eds., 2009).
60
Id. at 277.
61
Council Directive 95/46, art. 3, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31-50 (EC).
62
Newman, supra note 56.
63
Council Directive 95/46, art. 3, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31-50 (EC).
64
See Id.
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in order to keep exploiting individuals is still more profitable than not
committing the offenses in the first place.65
To add more gray area, Safe Harbor policies have increased the middle
ground for US businesses.66
The US response to the 1995 Directive was embodied in the
International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, a move to resolve the
major trade conflict that the new rules sparked by allowing US
companies to self-certify that they met an ‘adequacy’ requirement
for E.U. privacy protection.67
In effect, those businesses that qualify under Safe Harbor can operate within
the EU while maintaining their data centers and places of operation in the
United States. Safe Harbor has been a point of contention for EU member
states that wish to sequester their data within the EU and would prefer for
none of that data to ever be stored within the United States for fear of
seizure and/or exploitation.68
The Safe Harbor provisions are as follows:
(i) notice of the purpose for collection of the information and how
individuals can contact the organization and to whom it will be
shared;
(ii) a choice to opt out;
(iii) the obligation to follow EU contracting standards in onward
transfers to third parties;
(iv) access rights so individuals may correct data;
(v) security precautions must be adequate;
(vi) data integrity steps should ensure that data is “reliable for its
intended use [and] is accurate, complete and current”; and
(vii) enforcement provisions that empower the organization to
enforce complaints and verify compliance with other principles.69

65
66
67
68
69

Alo, supra note 8, at 1132–37.
Wolf, supra note 15, at 250–52.
Suuberg, supra note 4, at 279.
See id.
Meyer, supra note 32, at 111–12.
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Those arguing that big businesses have free-reign in the current system
have decried the current Safe Harbor structure as an inadequate protection;
they view the current system as not stringent enough.70 These provisions are
much closer to the EU standard since notice, access rights, and the option to
opt out are mainstays of the EU regime. However, the Safe Harbor
principles rely on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for enforcement,
and detractors say that the incentive for the FTC to enforce them is minimal
because they do not necessarily increase compliance with US law.71 In
effect, companies would be able to self-certify without the veracity of their
certification being challenged.
Ultimately, many feel that the current system allows large American
companies an unfair advantage. The data they carry is necessary, but they
do not have to follow the same rules as most EU companies. This gives
them a competitive advantage overseas, especially when their data does not
have to be stored within the EU. US Companies are allowed to access the
data under the more lenient US privacy regime while the data is stored in
US data centers.
2. Challenges Under New Legislation
US-based business will have to adapt if the proposed legislation is
enacted as is. Not only will the penalty structure be more prohibitive, but
also many of the exemptions will be lost.72 Specifically, Safe Harbor might
no longer be recognized as a legitimate protection within the EU, which
would force data collectors to change their data transfer and storage policies
a great deal.73 Safe Harbor was intended to bridge the gap between the two
regimes to allow US companies to reach some level of EU acceptable
protection, but if the situation continues as is, those companies will have to
70
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maintain compliance with two separate protocols.74 The exemption structure
has proven lucrative for these US businesses and for the countries they
operate in, and the new penalty structure may be too harsh. “John Higgins,
director general of DigitalEurope, which represents companies including
Apple, Microsoft, and IBM, urged member states to look critically at it.
‘Rushing through a half-baked law risks throwing away a vital and much
needed opportunity to stimulate economic growth.’”75
In 2014, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership indicated
that meeting the demands of two separate regulatory structures is needlessly
difficult.76 The European Commission echoed this sentiment by saying,
“Regulatory barriers have long been recognized as the most significant
impediment to trade and investment between the EU and the USA.”77
Furthermore, it is not always clear which regulatory scheme to follow when
they conflict.78 Companies are going to have to figure out the most cost
effective methods through trial and error.
US companies also face a dilemma with regard to the right to be
forgotten, and it has been hotly debated whether that provision is even
possible given freedom of speech concerns in the United States.79 If they are
ordered to comply with a petition to be forgotten, will they then have to
delete the same data on their US databases? The question has been asked
but not answered, and the EU has not yet finalized a concrete set of rules for
this provision.80
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III. US PRIVACY LAW
As discussed previously, the United States differs greatly from the EU
with regard to personal data protection. Part of this gap (which has widened
since 9/11) exists because of the prioritization of security over personal
privacy in the United States, but there are also inherent differences in the
basic structure of the US regime. The sectoral structure creates both
advantages and disadvantages for those seeking to protect personal privacy.
A. Sectoral System
The idea behind the sectoral system is that regulations for data protection
are determined sector by sector, as opposed to relying on a uniform set of
regulations across all areas, like the EU omnibus structure does.81 This
system allows for flexibility because different sectors have different privacy
concerns. Similarly, the personal data concerns of some sectors are much
more sensitive than those of others.82
Consider the medical industry, for example. In this manner, the sectoral
system is able to focus protections. It “concentrates on situations where
abuse will likely cause injury.”83 The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) is a perfect example of this structure. It is a
compliance scheme for personal medical data and it does not apply to other
types of data.84 Remember that under the EU scheme, the regulations are
pervasive across all forms of data. The practical effect of HIPAA is that
people’s sensitive personal medical data is protected and can only be shared
under specific and limited instances. Outside or unauthorized access to this
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sensitive information is only possible by following the guidelines set out by
HIPAA.85
In the same manner that HIPAA increased the protections of certain types
of data, the US system has reduced protections for other types. Among
these reductions in protection are the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) and National Security Letters (NSL).86
FISA opens the door for the United States to access the data of foreign
persons and organizations, despite other protections limiting that access.87
FISA includes procedures for the physical and electronic surveillance and
collection of “foreign intelligence information” between “foreign powers”
and “agents of foreign powers.”88 Because of this focus on non-US
information, it is often pointed to as one of the main contentions that EU
member states have with the US data privacy regime.89
NSL works as a sort of exception to US data protection and, like FISA,
allows broader access to otherwise protected information.90 NSLs are
administrative subpoenas issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) in authorized national security investigations “to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”91 In effect, US
agents are allowed to seize and access data that would be protected if it is
part of an ongoing national security investigation. Detractors have argued
that the FBI issues these NSLs arbitrarily without much of a showing of
cause or necessity.92
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Personal privacy advocates point to the sectoral structure as an indication
that outside data, or data including non-US private information, is not
prioritized as needing stringent protections.93 Certainly, this argument is
backed by the fact that the US regime protects its own citizens’ private data
in areas that it deems sensitive, such as healthcare, but opens the door in
multiple ways for the collection and access of foreign data through
mechanisms such as FISA and NSL. In practice, foreign data is actually
easier to seize because it often falls within the realm of national security
concerns, and the United States has explicitly noted that national security
will be prioritized over personal privacy, especially when it involves foreign
information.94 This type of prioritization has only increased in the last 15
years as terrorist acts and increased national security concerns have ushered
in even more lax protections of personal information.95
B. Post-9/11
The most common method for the US government to skirt data protection
regulation is through the use of search warrants and grand jury subpoenas.96
The Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probably cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.97
This Amendment applies to data protection as well. If the language of the
Fourth Amendment is followed, data may be seized and searched. However,
the government is not limited to just these mechanisms when it tries to
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confiscate data, and in the wake of 9/11, their powers of search and seizure
expanded greatly.98
The PATRIOT Act expanded the powers of both NSL and FISA. After
the PATRIOT Act, foreign data was easier to legally obtain, and what was
considered within the realm of a national security investigation was more
broadly interpreted.99 Surveillance, collection, and access of data were
allowed under more tenuous and subjective grounds. FBI subpoenas are
more easily obtained and sometimes are not even considered necessary for
the access of data. Furthermore, both of these mechanisms were extended
into previously unaffected areas.100 For instance, what was considered
“foreign” or having an effect on “national security” was much more loosely
construed.101 In effect, though personal data of non-US citizens was the
focus before 9/11, domestic data was brought within the net afterwards.
The result of the loosening of the restrictions on data seizure is called the
NSA Data Vacuum. The NSA Data Vacuum involves indiscriminate
collection of data without first establishing cause or necessity.102 In theory,
the vacuum is supposed to collect vast amounts of internet and cell phone
data that will remain stored but not accessed. Access to the data should only
be made with good cause or a showing of necessity.103 In practice, however,
there have been wide-ranging abuses. Edward Snowden, a whistleblower,
brought many of these abuses into the public limelight.104
Although the collection of data does not necessarily mean that the data is
being accessed or abused, the reaction of those in both the United States and
abroad has been resoundingly negative. This is because abuses are not only
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possible but are also presently occurring.105 This type of data collection also
directly conflicts with the EU’s prioritization of personal privacy as an
inherent right not to be superseded by other interests without good cause.
The reality of the data seizure situation is that, despite the PATRIOT
Act’s extension of FISA and NSL powers, and despite the presence of the
NSA Data Vacuum, it is still vastly more common for the US government
to seize data through traditionally legitimate means, such as a warrant or
subpoena.106 This fact not only means that access without cause is rare but
also that the United States could possibly abandon arbitrary access methods
with limited detrimental impact. Warrant and subpoena are the same means
that are largely accepted throughout the EU regime as well. Furthermore,
many of the EU member states have provisions in place to provide for the
seizure of data in cases involving national security, though their methods
may be less arbitrary.107
To address many of the perceived gaps in US data protection, US-based
businesses and government agencies have increasingly relied more on
privatized personal privacy protection.108 Data privacy professionals have
been used to consult and protect the personal data of US citizens in new and
innovative ways. These professionals are able to tailor the protections to
specific industries, and this move toward privatized data protection has
arguably resulted in more actual personal privacy protection in the US than
in the EU, where the EU member states are almost completely reliant on a
slow-changing bureaucratic approach.109 While these professionals have
largely been engaged in the business sector, their expertise could also
translate into increased personal protections as new innovations become
more widely available.
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C. EU Skepticism
Critics of the US privacy protection regime have consistently pointed to
US protections of personal data as being “inadequate” because of the
perception that data may be arbitrarily seized and accessed and that certain
types of data do not receive the same protections as data that the US
government has deemed “sensitive.”110 To some degree, these detractors
have a strong foundation for their skepticism. It is true that foreign data,
specifically, has received less protection, has been collected, and has been
accessed in the past.
The strongest proponents of stringent data regulation in the EU have
pushed to sequester all EU business and personal data onto EU servers.111
They would like to effectively block data sharing with the US government
and US-based corporations. This, they believe, would limit the exposure of
their data to abuses by both government and corporate bodies that face less
stringent regulations within the United States.112 Doing so would require
putting an end to the Safe Harbor provisions and other exceptions.
Data privacy professionals have argued, however, that it is virtually
impossible to maintain complete separation.113 Considering the realities of
the internet and the information age, sequestering all of the data may not be
feasible, and even if it could be done, there could be a huge detrimental
impact on those under the protection of both regimes.114
As discussed above, the EU has many of the same cause and
necessity-based mechanisms for skirting Directive provisions as the United
States to facilitate personal data seizure. What EU members are mostly
worried about, however, is that data seizures will occur arbitrarily or that
their data will be abused in the name of profit.
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IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Despite the rift between the two regimes, recent developments in both the
United States and EU have signaled the possibility of compromise. Practical
security concerns among EU member states, an increased focus on privacy
concerns in US policy, and the relative ease with which the United States
has developed a mutually beneficial data-sharing agreement with Canada
are among the promising signs.
A. Increased Security Concerns Among EU Members
Although the Directive leaves EU member states to fend for themselves
when it comes to national security concerns, those states still must maintain
overall compliance with the Directive. The result has been that data is less
easy to access, regardless of its importance to maintaining security. Recent
attacks have necessitated a reliance on outside sources of data collection,
namely, those employed by US intelligence agencies.
1. Terrorism and National Security
Bombings and terrorist attacks in EU member states have led to an
increased emphasis on security.115 Recent attacks, such as those in
Madrid,116 have forced a change in policy among the affected nations. “The
March 2004 terrorist bombings in Madrid injected a greater sense of
urgency into EU counterterrorism efforts, and gave added impetus to EU
initiatives aimed at improving travel document security and impeding
terrorist travel . . . [e]nhancing intelligence-sharing.”117 Other incidents
solidified this stance, and there has been a strong push toward allowing for
access and seizure of data in the interest of security. For instance, the 2005
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subway bombings in London “prompted additional efforts to improve
police, judicial, and intelligence cooperation.”118
The EU regime currently allows for data access but requires a showing of
cause. Because of this, valid access is determined on a case-by-case basis,
as opposed to allowing for blanket data collection by certain agencies.119 In
effect, the US system allows for a “collect first, ask permission later”
mentality, and while personal privacy is diminished, security is enhanced.
The EU’s model tends to take longer, and often the process is too slow to
allow for an adequate reaction to security concerns. It is “a traditionally
slow-moving body because of its intergovernmental nature and largely
consensus-based decision-making processes.”120
2. Reliance on US Intelligence Services
EU member states have actually benefited greatly from “catches”
provided by the US Data Collection Vacuum. This is despite the fact that
the Data Collection Vacuum, and especially the methods employed by the
NSA, has been used as an indicator that the US security regime cannot exist
in conjunction with the Directive or future EU legislation.121 These
“catches” are potential threats flagged within the US data collection net, and
the United States has been fairly open about sharing information on serious
threats with its allies within the EU.122
When one of these catches is made, the EU state can work to counter the
threat without having to sacrifice its own integrity on personal privacy
grounds. Prominent members of the global community have noted this
hypocrisy.123 In his article on the actual levels of privacy provided by the
two regimes, David Bender writes:
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One can almost see the intelligence chief in each of those nations
respectfully tapping the head of state on the shoulder and
whispering: ‘Um, you know, we’ve gotten some helpful
information from that US surveillance. Oh, and by the way, we do
some of that stuff, too.’124
Some European countries, such as France and England, have even
increased their reliance on the US security network, and it is not unheard of
for this heavy reliance to result in countries waiting for US agencies to flag
potential threats as part of an early warning system.125 In “Missed
Opportunity or Eternal Fantasy?: The Idea of a European Security and
Defence Policy,” Helen Sjursen notes the importance of “European
dependence on US intelligence.”126 She also points out that European
nations are often reliant on US intelligence to take military and defensive
action.127
Furthermore, European nations have eagerly invited law enforcement and
intelligence cooperation agreements. Bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties (MLAT) are common between US and European governments and
are not superseded by the Directive or other EU privacy legislation.128 As
discussed previously, the Directive leaves security matters to the individual
states to handle, so their agreements with the United States are used to
improve their own security.
On top of the MLATs between the United States and specific countries,
the EU itself has an MLAT with the United States that says “[g]eneric
restrictions . . . for processing personal data may not be imposed . . . as a
condition . . . to providing evidence or information.”129 These types of
agreements indicate that perhaps the EU is not that far removed from the
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US’s protection-over-privacy methodology. However, personal privacy can
still be adequately protected if the two regimes can work together on
developing a comprehensive framework.
B. Emphasis on Privacy Concerns in the US
In addition to the increased focus on security among EU member states,
the United States has shown a marked uptick in weight given to privacy
concerns. Some of this shift is the result of policies driven by business and
consumer concerns, but others have arisen through the judiciary.
1. Business and Consumer Policy
The White House recently issued a report on “Big Data” that addressed
many of the issues at hand with regard to the dichotomy between corporate
concerns, innovation, and technology and personal privacy concerns.130
The report recognizes that big data can improve the economy and save
lives; it also notes that big data practices present certain privacy-related
challenges, increase the risk and scope of data security breaches, and
weaken consumer protection.131 The report concludes by recommending six
safeguards that the administration believes are necessary for big data
analytics to truly benefit society132
The six safeguards are as follows: (1) advance the Consumer Privacy Bill
of Rights; (2) pass national data breach legislation; (3) extend privacy
protections to non-US persons; (4) ensure data collected on students in
school is used for educational purposes; (5) expand technical expertise to
stop discrimination; and (6) amend the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act.133
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Although both the US and EU standards were derived from the same Fair
Information Practice Principles developed in the 1970s, they have diverged
greatly since then. This Big Data report acknowledges that some global
criticism of the privacy policy in the United States is fair, and it expresses
an intention for the United States to move closer to international norms in
an effort to legitimize global data privacy interoperability.134
Aside from the report itself, there are other indications that US interests
are gravitating toward the mean with the help of business-generated criteria.
One such indicator is the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, which is a
“framework for protecting privacy and promoting innovation in the global
digital economy.”135 There has been recognition that global cooperation is
necessary to preserve advancement of technology and to protect the rights
of individuals.136
There has also been an expansion in recent years of protections for nonUS citizens, notably, from those countries with which the United States has
the strongest economic ties.137 These increased protections came about in
response to calls for more stringent regulation when US corporations
transfer data.138
Ultimately, it seems that both regimes have indicated that they agree on
at least one fundamental point—the need for a global system so that
protections are maintained across borders.
2. Judicial Decisions
Freedom from illegal search and seizure is an important right for US
citizens to protect themselves from government entities.139 Unfortunately,
there has been confusion as to how this right pertains to personal data.
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Some clarity on the issue was recently provided in an opinion delivered
by Justice Roberts. Riley v. California had to do with seizure of cell phones,
and the data contained therein, during an arrest.140 While it may seem like
this issue is dissimilar from the seizure of data through the internet because
of the involvement of arrests and the non-involvement of national security
interests, the language pertaining to data in particular is useful.
Additionally, data on cell phones is often not stored on the devices
themselves. Increasingly, the data is stored by the cell company through
cloud computing, so seizure of this kind of information is more complex
than it would seem and more similar to mass data seizure as well.141
In the decision, Chief Justice Roberts says that the issue to consider with
seizures is “balancing the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy against the degree to which it is needed to promote legitimate
government interests.”142 He goes on to say that cell phones place vast
quantities of personal information in the hands of individuals.143 The
confiscation of the data stored in a cell phone could result in a massive
intrusion on an individual’s privacy. Furthermore, the decision recognizes
that certain types of data are qualitatively different. Internet browsing
history, photos, emails, and the like could represent a significant and
sensitive part of peoples’ lives.144
Roberts points out that for a seizure of this type of sensitive information,
authorities should have “clear” and “workable” limitations when accessing
data.145 Requiring a warrant, or at least exigent circumstances, would satisfy
the court that there was cause and a legitimate government interest in the
invasion of personal privacy.146 The decision reflects an increasing trend (as
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seen in both this case and in the White House data report) toward the
protection of personal privacy and weighing that privacy more than the
principles of efficiency or security.
If this were to be the case for all seizures of data, the treatment would be
similar to that in the EU privacy regime. In the EU, personal privacy is
considered inviolable unless there is good cause, and the need for proof of
cause or exigent circumstance to seize or access data in the United States
has been called for by the international community.
C. Canadian Cooperation
The ability of the US and Canadian governments to come to a workable
compromise with regard to data privacy is proof that compromise is
possible between the United States and EU as well. Canada employs a data
privacy structure much more similar to that in the EU than to that in the
United States.147
One of the pillars of Canadian privacy law is the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).148 PIPEDA is similar
in many ways to the Safe Harbor principles, but with some notable
additions.149 They are as follows:
1) consent to collect and use the information must be express or
implied;
2) all organizations subject to PIPEDA must designate a privacy
officer;
3) written policies must be available for review;
4) written data retention guidelines must be implemented on the
preservation and destruction of data; and
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5) cross-border transfers are not prohibited or restricted; however,
the organization remains responsible for data wherever it is
located.150
In effect, these regulations are functionally similar to those used for Safe
Harbor, but they also provide increased protections more similar to those
called for by the EU privacy community.151 Ultimately, the Canadian
system is much more closely related to the EU regime than to that in the
United States.
However, Canada and the United States have found common ground.
Both have started to accept and promote the existence of security
professionals and security officers as the normal operating procedure.152
Confidentiality obligations in common commercial practice are enforceable
in both countries because of legal cooperation between them.153 Both also
have strict limitations on the use of certain types of data (like health
information).154 Although much has been made, even in Canada, of the US
data vacuum, PIPEDA Section 7 allows the Canadian government to collect
data about Canadian citizens with a subpoena.155 Canada often supplies that
data to US intelligence agencies for national security and legal purposes. In
effect, much of the information that would be subjected to the data vacuum
is supplied to the United States by the Canadian government anyway.156
Despite being more similar to the EU privacy regime and, more
importantly, despite a preference for the EU policies and regulations,
Canada has been able to work amicably with the United States to develop
strong data storage and sharing interactions.157 Much of this cooperation
happened because of practicality. It would be virtually impossible for
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Canadian government agencies and corporations to completely sequester
their data outside the United States.158 Canadians do, however, sometimes
experience problems when dealing with privacy restrictions that differ from
sector to sector and from state to state. However, these issues have been
largely addressed through the use of third-party data privacy professionals,
whose job is to keep the differing regulations straight for their clients.159
There are numerous detractors among Canadian privacy professionals
who harbor fears of “inadequacy” in the US privacy protection system.
Others, however, argue that these fears of abuse of non-US citizen data are
largely overstated.160 They point to the realities of the successful
interactions between the two countries thus far as proof that the differences
in policy and legislation are not as profound as many believe.161

V. PROPOSALS FOR
INTEROPERABILITY

COMPROMISE

NEEDED

FOR

GLOBAL

Global interoperability is the ultimate goal for those interested in
providing the best protections possible of both the right to privacy and the
need for security. According to the European Council, there are multiple
organizations working toward this goal, but no concrete resolution has been
reached.162 If the rift between the regimes were to increase, there would be
an untenable situation in which efficiency would dwindle and actual
protections would decrease.
A. Abandonment of Unworkable Provisions
In the interest of furthering global cooperation and increased privacy
security around the world, the EU should abandon the most controversial
and least workable provisions of their proposed legislation. Not only have
158
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these provisions held up the legislation, which many deem as necessary to
the protection of individual freedoms, but even EU member states cannot
agree on their validity. They will only serve to widen the rift between the
EU regime and the US system.
Although the United States has objections to many of the provisions of
the proposed legislation, and those objections have sometimes fallen on
deaf ears, EU member states have largely found those same provisions to be
the least palatable.163 The proposed legislation became necessary because
the EU wanted more deterrent legislation, and unenforceable provisions of
the Directive impeded that goal.164 If the legislation passed as is, there
would be multiple provisions that would be unworkable globally, which
would again leave the protection regime with a reputation for being
ineffective.
Some believe the limits on US exemptions to be knee-jerk reactions to
recent revelations about NSA data collection and possible abuses by the US
government, while others express a feeling that large US-based corporations
have taken advantage of Directive loopholes.165 Either way, instituting
policies designed just to get back at the US entities will not further the goal
of global interoperability, and it will ultimately only limit the protections of
citizens both within and outside of the EU.166
The right to be forgotten is an especially dubious proposition. It would be
nearly impossible to force companies across the globe to erase specific data
across all platforms and from all databases. The United States faces a
particularly difficult problem regarding this provision. It is fundamentally
opposed to one of the foundational tenets of the United States to force
censorship of speech because an individual did not want that speech to be
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heard. To mandate the removal of information from the web could catalyze
serious controversy in the United States.
The right to be forgotten could also involve a dangerous hindrance to the
right to information. Craig Newman, in his article “‘A Right to be
Forgotten’ Will Cost Europe,” asks, “Should links to a doctor’s negative
reviews be removed? The past behavior of a politician making a comeback
bid? The conviction of a man who possessed images of child abuse?”167
Newman goes on to explain that the financial burden imposed on US
businesses under the proposed legislation would cause them to avoid
establishing operational bases in Europe.168 If this provision were to be
passed, no US company with an operational base in Europe would be
completely free from the possibility of EU penalties.169 If this were to
happen, these European states would also lose out on any financial benefit
that the companies bring to the table.170 Abandoning the provision would
not only result in quicker passage of the new legislation and greater global
acceptance, but it would also prove mutually beneficial to both businesses
and governments in the EU.
Best of all, this compromise is feasible and would still enable proponents
of the right to be forgotten to enact it within their own states.171 For any of
those member states that feel that this provision is integral to furthering
personal privacy protections, the EU’s structure allows them to implement
said provision locally. Instead of imposing an overarching rule that could
dampen both the foreign and domestic economic climates of European
countries, each state should be able to weigh the advantages and
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disadvantages on their own to decide whether to implement. In a situation
like Spain’s, where the country believes the right to be forgotten is
beneficial, they would still be free enact that legislation on their own (as
evidenced by the Google Spain case).172
B. Using Cell Phone Decisions as a Framework
While search and seizure of personal property during an arrest differs
from personal privacy concerns during data collection and storage, both
situations involve the collection of private information and, in some ways,
electronic property is even more personal. The language of the recent
warrantless cell phone decision reflects a marked increase in concern for
privacy over security in the United States. The decision comments on both
the qualitative and quantitative differences between data and other forms of
property, and the qualitative portions especially should be considered in
reforming national privacy policy.173
If it is illegal for police to access data stored on a cell phone during the
course of an arrest, how then can it be legal to access and seize huge
amounts of personal data indiscriminately? The main qualm the EU has
with US data collection is that it can be accessed and used without a show
of cause or exigent circumstance.174 The cell phone case, coupled with the
White House’s “Big Data Report,” indicates a growing trend toward these
types of invasions of personal information as highly objectionable activities.
These trends should be expanded upon to help assuage some of the fears of
non-US entities.
Cell phones can be seized at the time of arrest, but the data cannot be
accessed without a show of cause or that the safety of officers or others is at
risk.175 This could be extrapolated to governmental data collection to give
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individual privacy adequate weight. By using this reasoning, the
government could still collect data using their broad nets, but they would
not be able to access or use the data unless they have a valid reason for
doing so. Security should not supersede a right to privacy unless there is
legitimate danger. The presence of these more stringent controls on data
access would cause the US regime to conform more closely to international
norms and would go a long way in shortening the rift with the EU.
It could be argued that it is not the role of the judiciary to set policy, and
that the language used in the cell phone decisions is not relevant to
interaction with foreign nations. This is true in terms of the president being
responsible for foreign policy concerns under the political question
doctrine.176 However, the judiciary does have the power to weigh in on the
constitutionality of domestic concerns, of which the current US privacy
regime is one. Furthermore, judicial language is often used in informing the
legislature when promulgating laws designed to protect the rights of its
constituents. When this decision is paired with the Executive Branch’s
willingness to find a workable solution, it is clear that US legislation must
begin to revert to the international mean.
C. Modeling US/EU Discourse After US/Canada Data Sharing
Much like the judicial decisions can be used as a more pervasive
framework for data privacy concerns, the interplay between the United
States and Canada with regard to data security should be looked to as an
example for the relationship between the United States and the EU.
Although Canada more closely follows the EU model of data protection
than the US model, it has managed to find common ground with its
southerly neighbor; finding common ground should be possible between the
larger US and EU regimes.
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A huge catalyst for this success has been the reliance on data privacy
professionals. These unbiased third parties have laid the groundwork for
successful data interaction by both businesses and governments.177
Third-party consultants have proven more apt at discovering the middle
ground and providing stronger protections. This largely has to do with their
flexibility in not being bound by bureaucracy, and they have the freedom to
explore new technology and innovation.178 It is also in their best interest to
do so as they stand to gain monetarily by providing cutting-edge protection.
Leaks in data hurt their bottom line, and corporations already rely on these
professionals to keep information safe. Allowing the standard practices of
the private data security industry to guide the policies of the data protection
regimes would fulfill the goals of both the United States and EU. The
United States would be able to continue to maintain its sectoral system
flexibility by allowing the sectors themselves to determine the best
practices, and the EU would be able to point to increased protections as
furthering their privacy interests.
Another large realization helped the United States and Canada come to a
reasonable resolution. It would have been economically impractical to try to
sequester all sensitive data within one country or organization. Using this
realization as a starting point made cooperation a necessity. The Canadian
and US governments officially recognized the importance of the free flow
of information between the two countries in their Statement of the Free
Flow of Information and Trade in North America.179 “The governments
jointly noted that ‘Cross-border data flows are an important underpinning of
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all international trade transactions. . . .’”180 The same should apply to the
ongoing debate between the United States and EU. It is unfeasible to say
that US-based business and government entities will have no access to
personal European data. Furthermore, it is unenforceable.181 Global transfer
and storage of data is more the norm than an outlier, and the only way to
provide comprehensive protection is through global interoperability.182
Such arguments have facilitated cooperation between the United States
and EU in the past. The 2014 report from the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership commented on the state of cross-border regulatory
harmonization in investment legislation.183 They noted that because of the
joint recognition of economic priorities,
what was initially presented as impossible, such as the
compatibility of regulatory agencies and structures for
standardization in the EU and the U.S., does not appear quite so
difficult; that is, if the EU and the U.S. can agree on joint processes
when developing more compatible and coherent regulations in
various areas.184
This sort of joint recognition of priorities prompted the dialogue and
cooperation between the United States and Canada. The United States and
EU should feel comfortable collaborating in the same way on data privacy
issues.
Much like the fears of arbitrary data seizure by the United States have
proved to be overstated in Canada because of similar Canadian legislation,
and the cooperative data sharing that already takes place, the EU should
find that their concerns are overstated as well. Anti-terrorism and law
enforcement data sharing already takes place between the United States and
the EU and between the United States and individual member states of the
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EU. These agreements should be highlighted to limit the negative
perception of PATRIOT Act data collection and should be built upon to
strengthen the connections. The Canadian government published a
clarification on the actual state of data-sharing cooperation between the
countries in which it debunks some of the misconceptions, and the EU
could do the same.185
EU member states and the United States should build upon their MLATs
and come to data-sharing agreements similar to the one between Canada
and the United States. Doing so would provide those member states better
protection from arbitrary data seizure by the United States, but would also
allow the United States access to that data that most closely involves
national security.
The social concerns are numerous in deciding how to proceed, but as
with Canada, the EU should allow their business and economic concerns to
foster opportunity, innovation, and contractual safeguards. In turn, the
reliance on the use of better technology by third-party professionals should
lead to increased personal information protection while not limiting citizen
safety. In this manner, a viable solution is possible.

VI. CONCLUSION
The point of the data privacy reform taking place in the EU is to take the
Directive a step further and to provide the best possible protection of
personal privacy to EU citizens. This can be accomplished without
widening the gap between the EU’s regime and that of the United States.
Much has been made about the differences between the two regimes, but
there are clear-cut indicators that the two can workably interact.
Global interoperability and a more uniform system of protection across
nations is the only way to ensure that protections are maintained, and those
protections do not have to fundamentally hinder national security,
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innovation, or business interests. Both the EU and US authorities have
expressed the desire to strive for this sort of interoperability, but they have
yet to take steps toward implementing it. Compromise would be mutually
beneficial, and it could be achieved by following recent trends. The EU
needs to acknowledge its security concerns, and needs to abandon
provisions of its legislation that inhibit passage and cooperation. Similarly,
the United States needs to acknowledge the weight and sensitivity of
personal privacy concerns, as noted by the Supreme Court, and must
extrapolate that weight into increased protections. Finally, both regimes
should look toward the cooperative nature of the Canadian regime as a
roadmap for further discussion.
This article is by no means meant to cover a complete list of data privacy
concerns across the two relevant regimes, nor is it meant to imply that the
three compromises proposed are the only avenue for interoperability.
However, for citizens of both the United States and the EU to be actually
and justly protected by these protection regulations, and for individual
rights to be honored in the face of growing security concerns, there must be
at least a modicum of cooperation and uniformity. Otherwise, personal
privacy will continue to slip through the gaps between the two systems.
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